










The consensus view in economics is that labor markets are polarizing as job
creation takes place in high-skilled and low-skilled occupations, while jobs
shrink in midskilled ones. The authors argue that, in theoretical terms,
polarization runs counter to all the trends that shaped the job structure
over the past decades: skill-biased technological change, the international
division of labor, and educational expansion. The authors then show that
the polarization thesis does not hold empirically. They use the European
Labor Force Survey to analyze occupational change for Germany, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom from 1992 to 2015 and define good
and bad occupations with four alternative indicators of job quality: earnings,
education, prestige, and job satisfaction. Job growth was by far strongest in
occupations with high job quality and weakest in occupations with low job
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quality, regardless of the indicator used. The authors find clear-cut occupa-
tional upgrading for Germany, Spain, and Sweden. In the United Kingdom,
the data support the polarization thesis when job quality is measured with
earnings. If job quality is defined with education, prestige, or job satisfaction,
the results show occupational upgrading. In all four countries, production
workers and office clerks lost ground, whereas employment strongly
expanded in the salaried (upper) middle class among managers and
professionals.
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Over the past few years, the view that the labor markets of Europe
and Northern America are polarizing has become widely accepted in
economics (Autor & Dorn, 2013; Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008; Goos,
Manning, & Salomons, 2009, 2014). Employment polarization is
defined as jobs growing both in highly paid and low-paid occupations
but decreasing in midpaid occupations. The result is the hollowing out
of the employment structure and, supposedly, the erosion of the (lower)
middle class. In a recent report, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017) embraces this view
and argues that “over the past two decades, all regions considered
have experienced a process of polarization away from middle-skill
jobs to low- and high-skill employment” (p. 80).
An evolution where employment grows only at the upper and lower
end of the skill structure but shrinks in intermediate occupations would
be no less than revolutionary. It fundamentally contrasts with the
European experience of the past 40 years where technology constantly
increased the demand for high-skilled staff at the expense of low-skilled
personnel, where the onset of globalization shifted labor-intensive mass
production from the North to the South, and where educational expan-
sion massively augmented the supply of mid- and highly qualified work-
ers (Crouch, 1999; Ta˚hlin, 2007).
Of course, upgrading trends from the past do not automatically trans-
late to the present and future. Still, the finding of employment polarization
is paradoxical because it seems to run counter to all the forces that shaped
the job structure over the past few decades: skill-biased technological
change, the international division of labor, and educational upgrading.
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Our article resolves this paradox by showing that the empirical evi-
dence for job polarization does not hold for Western Europe. When
analyzing occupational change for Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom from 1992 to 2015, we find clear-cut occupational
upgrading. Contrary to the most influential comparative studies in eco-
nomics (Goos et al., 2009, 2014; OECD, 2017), our analysis includes the
entire workforce (notably also agricultural workers, migrants, the self-
employed, and civil servants), uses disaggregate measures of occupa-
tions, and rank orders occupations into five even-sized groups based on
several indicators of job quality.
Our article thus joins a handful of comparative studies in sociology
that show that unlike in the United States (Dwyer, 2013; Wright &
Dwyer, 2003), there has not been any pervasive job polarization
in Western Europe (European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions, 2015; Ferna´ndez-Macıas, 2012;
Ferna´ndez-Macıas & Hurley, 2017; Oesch, 2013; Oesch & Rodrıguez
Mene´s, 2011; Ta˚hlin, 2007).
After the seminal article by Wright and Dwyer (2003) on polariza-
tion in the United States, research on change in the employment
structure has commonly defined the quality of jobs with earnings.
Occupations are thus considered as good if they are highly paid and
as bad if they are low paid. Our article examines as to whether this sole
focus on earnings leads to a ranking of occupations—and, linked to it,
an aggregate pattern of employment change—that properly reflects the
quality of work in growing and declining jobs. If job quality is a multi-
dimensional concept, it may not be usefully reduced to wages (Mu~noz
de Bustillo Llorente, Ferna´ndez-Macıas, Anton, & Esteve, 2011).
We examine occupational change with four indicators of job quality:
an occupation’s median work income, level of education, prestige, and
job satisfaction. The literature on job quality often emphasizes a single
dimension, with different disciplines preferring different indicators:
Economists focus on pay, sociologists on skill and autonomy, and
psychologists on job satisfaction (Findlay, Kalleberg, & Warhurst,
2013, p. 443). We try to combine these four indicators in a single
study. However, our focus is not on job quality per se, but on deter-
mining the aggregate pattern of employment change—and on establish-
ing as to whether this pattern varies according to whether occupations
are considered as good or bad based on either one of these
four indicators.
Our analysis of Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
combines microlevel data from three different sources. We rely on the
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European Labor Force Surveys (EU-LFS) 1992–2015 to trace occupa-
tional change but impute information on job satisfaction from the
European Social Survey (ESS) and on work income from the
European Structure of Earnings Survey (SES).
Our article first discusses the theoretical arguments pleading
for either occupational upgrading or polarization. It then reviews the
concept of job quality and presents our data and analytical strategy.
The Results section singles out the most strongly growing and declining
occupations and then shows the pattern of change in the employment
structure according to the four job quality indicators. The Conclusion
section revisits the debate on job polarization.
The Theoretical Case for Upgrading
What theoretical reasons lead us to expect a scenario of occupational
upgrading, understood as disproportionate employment growth in well-
paid and highly skilled occupations at the expense of low-paid and less
skilled occupations?
In the long run, change in the employment structure is driven by
technology as workers are made redundant in occupations strongly
affected by technological progress and switch to occupations for
which technology has less influence or in which technology is comple-
mentary to workers’ skills. Over the past decades, the former shrinking
occupations were typically defined by tasks of low complexity that
require modest skills such as the jobs of farmhands and manual
manufacturing workers, supermarket vendors, and file clerks. In paral-
lel, technological progress led to increasing labor demand for occupa-
tions defined by higher complexity and skill requirements such as
computer scientists and engineers, lawyers and bankers, medical doc-
tors and teachers. This upskilling of the employment structure came to
be known in the 1990s as skill-biased technological change (Berman,
Bound, & Machin, 1998) and was used to explain the widening gap in
both wages and unemployment risks between low- and high-skilled
workers (Acemoglu, 2002).
Over the past decades, the impact of technology on the employment
structure was reinforced by globalization—notably by import competi-
tion from emerging economies and the offshoring of jobs in
manufacturing and services to countries with lower wages. Research
typically found low-skilled workers to be the group most vulnerable
to displacement by international trade and foreign offshoring
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(OECD, 2007, p. 129). Globalization thus seems to further tilt the occu-
pational structure upward.
A third macrostructural trend that fostered occupational upgrading
is educational expansion. Over the past 50 years, educational attain-
ment has risen substantially for each ensuing cohort as schools, voca-
tional colleges, and universities succeeded in reducing the share of
workers with less than upper secondary education and in increasing
the share of workers with tertiary education (OECD, 2011, p. 15).
These shifts in skill supplies likely affect the pattern of occupational
change—if firms choose their production techniques and create jobs not
only on the basis of technology but also with regard to the available
skills in a given labor market (Korpi & Ta˚hlin, 2009, p. 184). To the
extent that the availability of high-skilled workers has risen steeply
while that of midskilled workers has remained stable and that of low-
skilled workers has plummeted, one would expect that the employment
structure has upgraded. This seems all the more likely as unemployment
rates have fallen for the growing group of the highly educated relative
to the shrinking group of the lowly educated (OECD, 2012, p. 135).
The Theoretical Case for Polarization
What are the arguments that shattered the consensus view of occupa-
tional upgrading? The main theoretical impetus for polarization came
from Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) who proposed a novel distinc-
tion between jobs consisting of either routine or nonroutine tasks. They
argued that machines are not a good substitute for nonroutine tasks, be
it abstract tasks requiring cognitive skills for decision-making and com-
plex communication, or interpersonal service tasks requiring basic
social perceptiveness and hand–eye coordination. While abstract tasks
are typically done in professional or managerial jobs that require higher
education, many interpersonal service tasks are at the reach of any
individual with basic socialization.
By contrast, jobs mainly consisting of routine tasks can be taken over
by technology. This applies to manual manufacturing jobs as well as
clerical jobs in the back office. Computers may thus supplant for
many production jobs as well as for the calculating and communicative
functions of cashiers, telephone operators, and secretaries. This auto-
mation is seen as an important reversal because clerical jobs require a
certain level of numeracy and literacy—and are thus not at the very
bottom of the occupational hierarchy (Autor et al., 2003, p. 1284).
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The spread of computer technology after 1990 is seen as having
fostered job growth in high-end analytical occupations and low-end
interpersonal service occupations while making routine jobs in
manufacturing and the back office increasingly redundant. The theo-
rists of polarization expect these routine occupations to be set in the
middle of the skill and earnings distribution—although no clear expla-
nation is advanced why routine jobs should cluster in the middle rather
than the bottom of the skill and wage hierarchy.
A second argument in favor of polarization focuses on labor supply.
It maintains that simply looking at average educational attainment
ignores that recent migration flows were defined by a bimodal skill
distribution (OECD, 2008, p. 83). Notably, the United Kingdom and
the United States attracted not only high-skilled immigrants but also
many lowly educated migrants from Eastern Europe (as the United
Kingdom) and Central America (as the United States). Accordingly,
two thirds of jobs created in the bottom tier of the American labor
market during the 1990s were filled by Hispanic immigrants (Wright
& Dwyer, 2003, p. 309). Similarly, immigration from Eastern Europe
fueled job growth in low-end service jobs in the United Kingdom after
the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 (Oesch, 2013, p. 96).
Without a quickly growing pool of workers willing to fill these low-
wage jobs, the labor market’s bottom-end would not have expanded,
and the scope for polarization would have been limited.
Despite these two arguments on routine tasks and immigration, the
theoretical case for polarization requires some imagination.
Polarization comes about only if employment in midskilled (routine)
occupations declines faster than in low-skilled (nonroutine) occupa-
tions. This poses two problems. First, it is unclear which industries
and occupations would propel massive creation of low-end jobs.
Many of the traditional sources of low-skilled employment—be it in
agriculture, along assembly lines, in sweatshops, filing archives, or
behind cashier counters—have dried out or were offshored, and
growth in personal care and domestic help seems insufficient to com-
pensate for these losses. As a consequence, although rising educational
attainment has strongly reduced the number of low-skilled workers,
their unemployment rates relative to that of mid- and, above all,
high-skilled workers have constantly risen over the 1990s and 2000s
in Europe (OECD, 2012, p. 135).
A second problem relates to the expectation that occupations domi-
nated by routine tasks are midskilled, whereas occupations composed of
nonroutine tasks are low-skilled. This expectation seems unsupported by
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European survey data: An important share of routine manual work is
low-skilled (done by assemblers, machinists, cashiers, and file clerks),
whereas an important share of nonroutine interpersonal service work is
midskilled (done by social workers, childcare workers, or nursing assis-
tants). Routine tasks and skills are thus not associated in the U-shaped
way predicted by polarization but linearly as expected by skill-biased
technological change: On average, the more routine tasks an occupation
involves, the less complex it is and the lower its skill requirements are
(Ferna´ndez-Macıas & Hurley, 2017; Oesch & Rodriguez, 2011).
It is, of course, possible that many routine manual occupations
require low skills but are midpaid. Jobs in routine production and the
crafts tend to rank higher in terms of earnings than educational require-
ments, whereas occupations in personal and social services rank higher
on education than earnings (Murphy & Oesch, 2016). The declining
groups of manual production and craft workers may thus hold jobs
that only require modest education, but as these jobs are set in
capital-intensive workplaces with strong trade unions, they nonetheless
offer midrange wages. This leads us to the question of how to measure
job quality when analyzing the nature of occupational change
over time.
Measuring Good and Bad Jobs
There is no clear consensus in the literature of what job quality is
(Findlay, Warhurst, Keep, & Lloyd, 2017; Kalleberg, 2012). In econom-
ics, job quality tends to be equated with monetary rewards: Good jobs
yield high earnings and bad jobs low earnings. While earnings may well
be the most consequential—and most reliably measurable—indicator of
an occupation’s quality, it seems a stretch to consider them as synon-
ymous with skills as economists commonly do.1 The correlation
between an occupation’s skills and earnings is imperfect if earnings
depend not only on skills and productivity but also on bargaining
power and social norms (Bol & Weeden, 2015; Bosch & Weinkopf,
2017). Some low-skilled jobs such as car assemblers pay well, whereas
some high-skill jobs are associated with modest earnings, typically
teachers in some countries and U.S. states (Kalleberg, 2011, p. 114).
As a result, sociologists tend to privilege multidimensional indicators
of job quality that also include nonmonetary measures. Mu~noz de
Bustillo Llorente et al. (2011) define job quality as “those attributes
of work and employment that have a direct impact on workers’ well-
being” (p. 470). Following this definition, a bundle of job attributes
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potentially matter to workers. Besides autonomy and control, five
dimensions of job quality are commonly singled out: skill, work
effort, personal discretion, pay, and security (Gallie, 2012; Green,
2006). Other authors emphasize the inherently personal dimension
of what constitutes a good or bad job and thus argue that the quality
of jobs should be evaluated with subjective indicators such as job
satisfaction (Clark, 2005).
The decisive question is whether these different dimensions of job qual-
ity are positively correlated to each other. There are good theoretical
reasons for such an assumption. Individuals with more human
capital should not only be more productive but also command more
labor market power and thus induce employers to offer them a more
advantageous employment relationship (Goldthorpe, 2000). Likewise, seg-
mentation theories expect the primary labor market to be made up of well-
paying and secure jobs that are associated with promotion prospects,
whereas the secondary labor market consists of low-paid and insecure
jobs without opportunities for advancement (Kalleberg, 2011, p. 11).
However, earnings and other job amenities may also be correlated
negatively—as expected by the theory of compensating differentials that
still has some traction among orthodox economists. This theory was
originally formulated by Adam Smith (1776/1811) who argued that
“when the inconstancy of employment is combined with the hardship,
disagreeableness and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises the
wages of the most common labor above those of the most skillful
artificers” (p. 73).2 In this view, employers use one kind of benefit—
typically earnings—to compensate for otherwise unpleasant working
conditions in jobs such as oil rig workers, coal miners, or undertakers.
Empirically, the theory of compensating differentials has not fared well.
Earnings tend to correlate positively with a large set of job quality indi-
cators and notably with job satisfaction (Clark, 1996). The conclusion
from a large overview is that the argument of compensating differentials
does not hold “except in some extreme cases involving very serious health
risks” (Mu~noz de Bustillo Llorente et al., 2011, p. 449).
Our Indicators of Job Quality
The focus of our study does not lie on job quality per se, but on occu-
pational change. However, the analysis of occupational change depends
on a reliable indicator of job quality. Only by distinguishing between
more or less advantageous jobs can changes in the employment
structure be interpreted as upgrading, downgrading, or polarization.
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Our study thus compares the pattern of occupational change by using
four indicators of job quality.
The first indicator is earnings. The employment relationship, in
essence, boils down to an exchange of work effort for economic rewards
(Rose, 2003, p. 506). Moreover, earnings have the advantage of being
commonly recorded in surveys and can thus be reliably measured.
A second indicator concerns the skill requirements of a job. Because
this indicator is difficult to measure, earlier studies have used the mean
level of education that workers hold in a given occupation (Ferna´ndez-
Macıas, 2012, p. 9; Oesch, 2013, p. 48). The idea is that workers’ edu-
cation serves as a proxy for the skill requirements in a given job.
A third indicator refers to prestige and the social evaluation ascribed
by people to different occupations (Treiman, 1976). Prestige is a mea-
sure of an occupation’s social desirability and thus taps into symbolic
rather than economic power. Some occupations may score low in terms
of material conditions but be prestigious (say writers), whereas others
pay well but may receive less public recognition (say real estate agents).
Our fourth indicator is job satisfaction and reflects the personal
evaluation of how good or bad a job is. Job satisfaction has the advan-
tage that it is not the researcher who decides whether a job is good or
bad, but the workers themselves provide an evaluation of their job’s
quality (Dahl, Nesheim, & Olsen, 2009, p. 10).
Data and Analytical Strategy
Data
We examine whether the findings of occupational upgrading or polar-
ization hold across different institutional contexts. We thus select four
European countries that cover a broad range of institutional variety
and come close to Esping-Andersen’s (1999) ideal-typical welfare
regimes: Germany as a conservative Continental regime, Spain as a
conservative Mediterranean, Sweden as a social-democratic Nordic,
and the United Kingdom as a liberal Anglo-Saxon welfare regime.
While these countries have different traditions of state involvement in
collective bargaining and wage setting (Bosch & Weinkopf, 2017) and
differ in the extent of precarious work (Mai, 2017, p. 290), their employ-
ment structures are exposed to similar influences stemming from
technological change and globalization. Moreover, with more than
200 million residents, the four countries combined comprise close to
half of the European Union’s total population.
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We use individual-level data from three different sources. We rely on
the EU-LFS to trace change in the employment structure from 1992 to
2015 for Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom and, because of
shorter availability of occupational codes, from 1997 to 2015 for
Sweden. The EU-LFS contains information on occupations and educa-
tion but not on job satisfaction and (before 2011) earnings. We thus
impute, for each occupation, median earnings from the European SES
in 2002 (2006 for Germany)3 and job satisfaction from the ESS, merg-
ing the three rounds (2006, 2010, and 2012) that include a question
about job satisfaction.
We include in our analytical sample all workers ages 20 to 64 who
spend at least 20 hours per week in gainful employment, as employees,
employers, or self-employed. We thus exclude only workers with a mar-
ginal attachment to the labor market such as teenagers, senior workers,
and small part timers. For Germany, where growth of mini-jobs has
been an important feature since their introduction in the early 2000s, we
run a robustness check by including all jobs of at least 8 hours per week
(one work day per week).
Our goal is to use as encompassing a definition of the workforce as
possible. Therefore, unlike much research on occupational change in
economics, we also include agricultural workers, civil servants, women,
migrants, or the self-employed. The employment shares of these fre-
quently excluded categories are not constant over time but have strong-
ly declined (as for agricultural and self-employed jobs) or increased over
the past decades (as for jobs held by migrants, women, or civil servants;
Oesch, 2013). Our definition leaves us with large analytical samples
of between 13,002 (Sweden in 1997) and 264,266 observations
(Germany in 2015).4
Measures
Our analysis of change in the employment structure relies on occupa-
tional information at the most detailed level available in the EU-LFS,
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)-1988 at
the three-digit level. Because we impute information on earnings and
job satisfaction from two different datasets than EU-LFS, we need to
adapt our occupational variable for the analysis using earnings and job
satisfaction.5 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the number of occupa-
tions that we distinguish for each of our four occupational rankings.
Eurostat shifted in 2011 from ISCO-1988 to the new classification of
occupations ISCO-2008. We use Harry Ganzeboom’s crosswalk to
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recode occupations from ISCO-2008 to ISCO-1988.6 As different occu-
pational classifications can never be totally harmonized by back-coding,
we present the pattern of occupational change for three subperiods
(1992–2000, 2000–2008, and 2008–2015), knowing that only the last
subperiod is affected by the break in the occupational coding.
Moreover, as a robustness test, we also present the result of occupa-
tional change if occupations are harmonized the other way around,
from ISCO-1988 to ISCO-2008.
The measurement of our four indicators of job quality is straightfor-
ward. First, we rank order occupations based on their median gross
hourly work income. Second, we calculate average education by distin-
guishing five hierarchically ordered levels: (a) primary education, (b)
lower secondary, (c) upper secondary, (d) first stage of tertiary,
and (e) second stage of tertiary education. Occupations are then rank
ordered based on their mean educational attainment taken from EU-
LFS 1998 (for Spain and Sweden) or 1999 (for Germany and the
United Kingdom).
Third, we attribute a prestige score to each occupation based on
Treiman’s (1976) Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale.
As a robustness check, we replicate these results with an alternative
(and newer) measure of social status and use the International
Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) developed by
Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). The results for occupations rank
ordered by ISEI lead to the same conclusions for occupational
change (see Figure A2 in the online Appendix).
Fourth, we use the question on job satisfaction in the ESS (“How
satisfied are you in your main job?” with answers from 0 extremely
dissatisfied to 10 extremely satisfied) to rank order occupations on the
basis of the proportion of workers reporting a value of job satisfaction
above the median job satisfaction in a given country.
We briefly look at the correlation between the four occupational
rankings of job quality (see Table A2 in the Appendix). The
Spearman rank correlations suggest that the occupational hierarchy
based on education and prestige is closely linked. In all four countries,
these two indicators tap into the same underlying dimension of job
quality. Correlations also tend to be positive between these two indica-
tors and occupations sorted on the basis of earnings, but they are much
weaker. The rank correlations are lowest with job satisfaction. Except
in Germany, occupations with higher job satisfaction seem to be neither
more prestigious nor having higher levels of education or earnings.
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Analytical Strategy
We examine change in the employment structure by adopting the
analytical strategy of job quality quintiles (Wright & Dwyer, 2003).
Its building blocks are occupations that are rank ordered, in turn, on
the basis of these four indicators: earnings, education, prestige, and job
satisfaction. These rank-ordered occupations are then grouped into five
job quality quintiles, Quintile 1 comprising the least advantageous and
Quintile 5 the most advantageous occupations. Each quintile comprises
20% of total employment at the beginning of the period under study,
thereby allowing us to calculate occupational change over time by trac-
ing employment changes in each of the five quintiles.
We would argue that this analytical strategy is a clear improvement
over earlier studies such as OECD (2017, p. 86) or Goos et al. (2009,
2014) which simply distinguish three occupational groups: high-skilled
occupations include ISCO Major Groups 1, 2, and 3; middle-skilled
occupations Major Groups 4, 7, and 8; and low-skilled occupations
Major Groups 5 and 9. This procedure ignores the construction logic
at the basis of ISCO which combines in Major Groups 4 to 8 occupa-
tions that are set at the same “second” skill level as opposed to ISCO
Group 9 (elementary occupations set at the first skill level; Elias, 1997,
p. 7). It is unclear why service and sales workers (ISCO Group 5) should
be less skilled than either craft workers (ISCO Group 7) or machine
operators and assemblers (ISCO Group 8). Moreover, it seems prob-
lematic to exclude ISCO Group 6 (agricultural workers) from an anal-
ysis of overall change in the employment structure. In terms of jobs, this
category was anything but constant over the past few decades. Finally,
the three skill groups do not correspond to employment tertiles but are
of highly uneven size. For a methodological critique of the polarization
result by Goos et al. (2009) that extends to OECD (2017), see
Ferna´ndez-Macıas (2012).
A potential concern of our analysis is that it leaves out unemploy-
ment. Change in the occupational structure refers only to jobs and is
thus computed only for individuals who work in paid employment in a
given occupation. In practical terms, this is not a major issue for our
analysis as the unemployment rates were comparable in the early 1990s
and the mid-2010s within the four countries under study, with a slight
decrease in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, and an
increase in Spain. Overall, our study leaves out, in each country, a
similar proportion of unemployed individuals at the beginning and
the end of our analysis.7
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Another concern of our method is that it assumes a country’s occu-
pational ranking by earnings, education, or the other indicators to have
remained constant between the 1990s and the 2010s. A large literature
review concludes that occupational hierarchies are stable across nations
and over time in terms of earnings, education, and prestige (Hout &
DiPrete, 2006, p. 3). Empirical studies also suggest that there is consid-
erable stability in the occupational earnings structure over time.
Occupations that are high-paid (low-paid) jobs in one decade were
still high-paid (low-paid) one to two decades later. Medical doctors,
lawyers, and business professionals were always at the top, farmhands,
cleaners, and textile workers at the bottom of the occupational hierar-
chy (Goos & Manning, 2007, p. 122; Lambert, Tan, Prandy, Gayle, &
Bergman, 2008, p. 189; Wright & Dwyer, 2003, Appendix).
We further examine this assumption for education, the indicator for
which we have the longest series in our data. We plot the relative edu-
cation of occupations in 1998/1999 against their relative education in
2013 and find for all four countries Spearman rank correlations that are
consistently high (0.83 in Sweden, 0.88 in Germany, 0.93 in the United
Kingdom, and 0.96 in Spain). These results suggest that occupations
with the highest (lowest) education in 1998 were also the occupations
with the highest (lowest) education 15 years later (see Figure A1 in the
online Appendix).
The Pattern of Occupational Change
We provide a first idea of the pattern of occupational change by singling
out the five occupations with largest absolute job growth over the period
under study. In all four countries, corporate managers in the private
sector make the list of the top five (see Table A3 in the Appendix).
This is also the case for business professionals everywhere except in
Spain, and for life science and health (associate) professionals in
Germany and Sweden. The shortlist of the most strongly growing occu-
pations includes not only high-end jobs but also more menial occupa-
tions such as domestic helpers, cleaners, and launderers (in Germany and
Spain) as well as personal care workers (in Spain and the United
Kingdom). By contrast, the occupations with the largest employment
loss over the past two decades mainly include low- and semiskilled pro-
duction jobs such as plant operators, assemblers, and builders on the one
hand and office clerks and sales assistants on the other.
Our main focus lies on the overall change in the employment struc-
ture and thus on Figure 1(a) to (d). They show a strikingly similar
Oesch and Piccitto 13
Figure 1. Employment change across job quality quintiles (in percentage points).
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pattern of occupational upgrading. Regardless of the indicator used,
job growth was strongest, in all four countries, in the occupations of
Quintile 5 where job quality is highest. The proportion of employment
in these top-end occupations increased by roughly 10 percentage
points—from 20% at the beginning of the 1990s to about 30% in
2015. In parallel, the employment share of the three bottom quintiles
declined each by 3 to 5 percentage points. As a result, the predominant
trend in the employment structure was not job polarization and the
hollowing out of the middle, but occupational upgrading. The use of
different job quality indicators leads to the same conclusion and our
substantial findings remain unchanged regardless whether job quality is
measured with earnings, education, prestige, or job satisfaction.
In Germany, regardless of the job quality indicator taken, job growth
was by far strongest in the top Quintile 5, followed by Quintile 4. To the
extent that employment tended to decline somewhat more in the middle
than the bottom quintile, upgrading may have been accompanied by a
mild polarization of the occupational structure. The results for Germany
remain unchanged if we enlarge the analytical sample to all jobs of at
least 8 hours per week and thus also include mini-jobs (see Figure A3 in
the online Appendix).
The thrust toward upgrading is also clear-cut in Sweden and Spain.
In Sweden, employment expanded most, by far, in the top Quintile 5,
regardless of the indicator taken. The same applies to Spain where the
extent of structural change was particularly impressive. The employ-
ment share in Quintile 5 almost doubled, expanding by 15 percentage
points, when job quality is measured with earnings, education, or pres-
tige. This finding echoes the results by Garrido and Rodriguez Rojo
(2011, p. 50) who show with the Spanish labor force survey 2000–2010
that much more employment was created in occupations with high edu-
cation than in occupations with medium and low education.
The results are not as straightforward for the United Kingdom. As in
the other three countries, job growth was largest in the Quintile 5. Yet if
occupations are sorted on the basis of their median earnings, employ-
ment expanded both in the top and bottom quintile, thereby leading to
polarization. By contrast, the polarization thesis does not hold if job
quality is measured with education. In this case, employment in the
bottom quintile fell, and we observe upgrading.
A few occupations explain this difference in the United Kingdom.
Most central is the strongly growing occupational group of personal
care workers. While it is among the lowest-paid occupations (Wage
Quintile 1), it is not among the least educated ones (Educational
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Quintile 2). The opposite scenario applies to material recording and
transport clerks who witnessed strong job decline over the past decades.
This shrinking occupation requires only modest education (Educational
Quintile 1) but is not among the least paid ones (Wage Quintile 2).
Occupational Change Over Subperiods
The thesis of routine-biased technological change expects polarization
to gather speed with the spread of computer technology across work-
places (Autor et al., 2008, p. 318). This trend may be hidden by our
analysis that covers more than 20 years. We thus examine period effects
and calculate occupational change for three subperiods of roughly
8 years: 1992–2000, 2000–2008, and 2008–2015. Figure 2(a) to (d)
shows the results for the job quality quintiles using earnings and edu-
cation to rank order occupations. At the beginning of each subperiod,
occupations are reallocated into the five quintiles so that each quintile
comprises again 20% of total employment at the outset.
These analyses suggest that the occupational structure consistently
upgraded over the 1990s and 2000s. In Germany, Spain, and Sweden,
job growth was largest in Quintile 5 in every subperiod according to
(almost) every job quality indicator. Occupational upgrading is partic-
ularly evident for Sweden in the period between 2008 and 2015.
Results are again less straightforward for the United Kingdom where
we do observe disproportionate job growth not only in the top Quintile
5 but also in Quintiles 4 and 1. When taking earnings as job quality
indicator, we find that the employment structure in the United
Kingdom polarized in the 1990s and early 2000s. In contrast, the last
subperiod from 2008 to 2015 was defined by strong upgrading.
In all four countries, the employment shifts across quintiles tend to
be largest in the last subperiod, with a large job decrease in the bottom-
end occupations of Quintiles 1 and 2. These shifts may be due to the
disproportionate job losses during the Great Recession. The last sub-
period also coincides with strong employment decline in the middle
quintile in Spain where the number of construction jobs plummeted
after the housing bubble burst. However, these shifts in the last sub-
period could also be artificially inflated by the break in the occupational
classification from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08 (although we use a crosswalk
between the two classifications).
In a robustness test, we examine whether our results are distorted by
the break in the occupational classification and harmonize the occupa-
tional data on the basis of ISCO-08 (rather than ISCO-88). When
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Figure 2. Employment change across quintiles by subperiod (in percentage points).
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replicating the analysis of overall occupational change with ISCO-08
(using education as job quality indicator), we find the same pattern of
upgrading (see Figures A4(a) to A7(a) in the online Appendix).
Likewise, when replicating the same analysis with a linear measure of
education, rank ordering occupations on the basis of years instead
of levels of education, we obtain the same result of occupational
upgrading (see Figures A4(b) to A7(b) in the online Appendix).
Employment Shifts in the Class Structure
Some readers may be skeptical about the substantive meaning of job
quality quintiles. In a last analysis, we therefore use a more intuitive
method of depicting the pattern of occupational change by examining
shifts in the class structure. Social class is a shortcut for the resources
obtained and the constraints faced in different occupations, and thus
serves as a proxy for the life chances that working in a given occupation
entails (Goldthorpe, 2000).
We use a class schema based on two dimensions: a vertical dimension
of more or less advantageous employment relationships and a horizon-
tal dimension of different work logics (Oesch, 2006). The combination
of the two dimensions provides us with eight classes (see Table 1).
Three classes belong to the salaried middle class: (associate) managers,
technical specialists, and sociocultural (semi-)professionals. Two classes
form the working class: production workers and service workers, with a
third class—office clerks—situated in the twilight zone between the
middle and working class. Finally, two classes are composed of the
self-employed: large employers and liberal professionals on one hand
and small business owners on the other.8
Table 1 shows how the class structure evolved between 1992 and 2015.
It points to an upward shift in the occupational system that was primarily
driven by job growth within the salaried middle class, first and foremost
among managers and associate managers. Between the 1990s and 2015,
the employment share of the managerial class—defined largely—
increased by at least 9 percentage points in all four countries studied.
We also observe consistent employment expansion among technical pro-
fessionals and semiprofessionals (such as IT-professionals, engineers, or
technicians) as well as among sociocultural professionals and semiprofes-
sionals (such as medical doctors, teachers, or social workers).
In contrast, two occupational classes saw their proportion of total
employment substantially drop over the past two decades: production
workers and office clerks. Between the 1990s and 2015, production





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































workers went from more than 30% to 20% of the workforce in
Germany and Spain and from 20% to less than 15% in Sweden and
the United Kingdom. The decline in office clerks’ employment share
was smaller, but observable in all four countries.
Finally, the proportion of employment remained constant over time
in two other classes: among small business owners (except in Spain
where it strongly decreased) and interpersonal service workers (except
in Germany where it declined). The stability among interpersonal ser-
vice workers is critical as the employment structure in postindustrial
economies will polarize only if there is a sizeable expansion in low-end
interpersonal service jobs—an expansion that did not seem to have
taken place.
Discussion
Our analysis of occupational change in four European countries pro-
vides no support for the polarization thesis. On the contrary, over the
past two decades, employment expanded more in the advantageous
occupations of the sole top Quintile 5 alone than in the less advanta-
geous occupations of the three bottom Quintiles 1 to 3 combined—no
matter whether advantage refers to material or immaterial, objective or
subjective dimensions of job quality.
This finding holds across different subperiods. Between 1992
and 2015, job growth tended to be strongest in the top quintile in
every subperiod. This suggests that occupational upgrading in
Europe was a long-term structural trend that did not fundamentally
vary over the business cycle—a point also made by Manning
(2003, p. 329).
There is not only a basic similarity in the pattern of occupational
change over subperiods, but also across countries. The shifts in the
employment structure look very much alike in Germany, Spain, and
Sweden and show upgrading. Results are less straightforward for the
United Kingdom. When taking earnings as job quality indicator, we
find that the employment structure in the United Kingdom polarized in
the 1990s and early 2000s as shown by earlier studies (Goos &
Manning, 2007; Holmes & Mayhew, 2012). By contrast, if we rank
order occupations based on education, prestige, or job satisfaction,
the results point to upgrading of the occupational system over the
past two decades.
In all four countries, upgrading was the result of strong job growth
in Quintile 5. This is the key shift in the occupational structure which
20 Work and Occupations 0(0)
has been driving employment change since the early 1990s. Translated
into social classes, this means that labor market opportunities expanded
for the salaried (upper) middle class, whereas the core of the traditional
working class and subordinate white-collar employees lost ground. For
the polarization thesis to hold, we should also have observed job growth
in low-skilled services, among interpersonal service workers. However,
this mostly female class did not substantially increase its employment
share in any of the countries under study.
Conclusion
This article critically assessed the polarization thesis and, in light of the
empirical findings, rejects it for the past two decades in Western
Europe. Advanced economies continue to be most successful in the
automation and offshoring of low-paid, low-skilled, and low-status
occupations such as farm workers and plant operators, data-entry
clerks and sales assistants. In parallel, job expansion was most
vigorous in the occupations of the top quintile, among higher paid
and better skilled positions in management and the professions. These
findings strongly suggest that technological change continues to be skill-
biased, reducing demand for jobs that require little in terms of qualifi-
cations and increasing demand for jobs that are skill-intensive.
Contrary to the argument of compensating differentials, patterns of
occupational change do not vary substantially if job quality is measured
with prestige, job satisfaction, or education instead of earnings. For the
study of occupational change, the common use of earnings to rank
order occupations seems to give valid results. Wages do not compensate
for otherwise unpleasant working conditions but appear to be part of a
(positively correlated) bundle of monetary and nonmonetary rewards
that make a job more or less attractive. On the other hand, our analysis
also shows that earnings could be replaced, in the study of occupational
change, by the more commonly available information on educational
attainment in a given occupation.
The doom scenario of polarization and middle class erosion may
catch the newspapers’ headlines, but it does not reflect the structural
trends in Western Europe’s employment structure. Given the extent of
educational expansion over the past few decades, this is good news. As
technical colleges and universities were sending out highly educated
workers in greater numbers—and less qualified older cohorts went
into retirement—the economy was also creating more jobs in occupa-
tions requiring higher education.
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What are the policy implications of these results? The race between
education and technology (Tinbergen, 1975) will go on in the near
future. While demand for low-skilled work will by no means dry up
entirely, the job opportunities for workers with low qualifications will
continue to shrink. To fully harness the potential of technological
change for the labor market, state action will be needed at both ends
of the labor market. At the upper end, public investment into tertiary
education allows firms to hire highly qualified workers in sufficient
numbers and thus to take full advantage of technological progress.
At the lower end, a strengthening of both upper secondary schooling
and vocational education helps to reduce the numbers of workers with
low qualifications. By additionally pursuing an ambitious minimum
wage policy, governments can incite firms to invest into their workers’
productivity through upskilling rather than to rely on a stagnant low-
wage sector. The result may then be an ongoing process of inclusive
occupational upgrading.
Appendix
Table A1. The Number of Occupations Distinguished for Each
Occupational Ranking.
Earnings Education Prestige Job satisfaction
Germany 24 109 119 49
Spain 25 108 119 47
Sweden 104 87 119 46
UK 96 101 119 42
Note. UK¼United Kingdom.
Table A2. Correlation of Occupational Rankings Based on Different Job
Quality Indicators.
Germany Spain Sweden UK
Earnings—education 0.14 –0.09 0.65 0.79
(0.51) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00)
Earnings—prestige 0.37 0.44 0.79 0.78
(0.08) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
(continued)
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Table A2. Continued
Germany Spain Sweden UK
Earnings—job satisfaction 0.36 0.28 –0.50 –0.07
(0.09) (0.21) (0.00) (0.65)
Education—prestige 0.91 0.81 0.85 0.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education—job satisfaction 0.31 –0.46 –0.53 –0.21
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
Prestige—job satisfaction 0.33 –0.29 –0.56 –0.28
(0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08)
Note. p values in parenthesis; bold coefficients: p< .05.
Earnings are measured in 2002 (except Germany: 2006); education and prestige are measured
in 1999 (except Spain and Sweden: education in 1998); job satisfaction is measured in 2006.
UK¼United Kingdom.






Most strongly growing occupations
Germany Corporate managers (private sector) 3.6 8.6
1992–2015 Life science and health associate professionals 1.0 3.7
Business professionals 0.7 3.1
General managers (public sector) 1.8 3.9
Domestic helpers, cleaners, and launderers 2.1 3.9
Spain Customer services clerks 1.7 5.9
1992–2015 Corporate managers (private sector) 7.0 10.1
Restaurant services workers 3.6 6.3
Personal care and related workers 1.4 3.9
Domestic helpers, cleaners, and launderers 5.0 7.0
Sweden Corporate managers (private sector) 2.8 7.0
1997–2015 Business professionals 2.1 5.4
Primary and preprimary education teachers 1.8 4.7
Life science and nursing professionals 1.1 3.0
Associate business, tax, government professionals 1.9 3.6
United Kingdom Business professionals 1.1 6.4
1992–2015 Personal care and related workers 2.9 7.3
Corporate managers (private sector) 8.4 11.6
Finance and administrative associate professionals 3.0 6.1
(continued)
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Computing and hard science professionals 1.5 3.1
Most strongly declining occupations
Germany Miners, builders, and painters 3.8 1.9
1992–2015 Craft workers, miscellaneous 3.2 1.3
Building finisher trade workers 3.8 1.3
Metal, machinery, and related trades workers 7.2 4.7
Salespersons 4.6 0.3
Spain Farmers (crops and garden) 4.3 1.8
1992–2015 Precision and printing craft workers 5.3 2.6
Plant operators and assemblers 6.0 3.2
Salespersons 5.0 0.8
Secretaries and mail clerks 8.1 0.5
Sweden Building finisher workers 2.8 1.2
1997–2015 Teaching associate professionals 2.4 0.0
Salespersons 4.3 0.7
Plant operators and assemblers 7.2 3.0
Secretaries and mail clerks 6.2 0.9
United Kingdom Precision and printing craft workers 3.1 1.2
1992–2015 Machine operators and assemblers 4.0 1.6
Library, mail, and office clerks 8.8 4.9
Salespersons 5.3 0.9
Secretaries and transport clerks 5.4 0.7
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Notes
1. An example is David Autor and David Dorn (2013) who label the job quality
dimension “skill percentile (ranked by 1980 occupational mean wage)”
(p. 1554).
2. Adam Smith (1776/1811) then gives the following example: “A collier work-
ing by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly about double,
and in many parts of Scotland about three times the wages of common labor.
His high wages arise altogether from the hardship, disagreeableness, and
dirtiness of his work.” (p. 73)
3. Note that the SES does not include small firms with less than 10 employees
nor the sector of agriculture. While there is no reason why the absence of
small firms should systematically change the earnings hierarchy of occupa-
tions, the absence of agriculture would be more problematic if the SES had
not such large sample sizes. We are able to rank order agricultural workers
(ISCO-1988 codes 611 to 615) because a sizeable number of them work in
other sectors, notably in construction (gardening and landscaping) and
manufacturing (food industry). Accordingly, the number of earnings obser-
vations provided by the SES for agricultural workers (ISCO Group 6) ranges
between a minimum of N¼ 151 (United Kingdom 2002) and a maximum of
N¼ 487 (Sweden 2002).
4. The number of observations in our analytical sample of the EU-LFS is as
follows: Germany: 198,002 (1992) and 264,266 (2015); Spain: 111,621 (1992)
and 60,940 (2015); Sweden: 13,002 (1997) and 172,668 (2015); United
Kingdom: 85,200 (1992) and 41,637 (2015). While the samples used for cal-
culating earnings in the SES are large, exceeding 100,000 individuals for each
country, our samples for calculating job satisfaction in the ESS are smaller
and include about 1,000 observations per year and country, prompting us to
merge the three ESS rounds with questions on job satisfaction.
5. As the SES records occupations for Germany and Spain only at the ISCO
two-digit level, we use a less detailed measure of occupation for the earnings-
based analysis of these two countries. Likewise, despite merging three
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rounds, the ESS has too few observations in some occupations to provide us
with reliable measures of job satisfaction. We thus cross occupational infor-
mation based on ISCO-3 digit (for larger occupations) and ISCO-2 digit (for
a few small occupations) with information on the economic sector, distin-
guishing between manufacturing, private services, and public services. This
allows us to base our rank ordering of occupations on at least 20 observa-
tions of job satisfaction per occupation in each country.
6. Most of our surveys had originally coded occupations with ISCO-1988. By
transforming ISCO-2008 into ISCO-1988 codes, we are able to keep as many
original occupational codes as possible. The codes used for the crosswalk
were downloaded from www.harryganzeboom.nl/isco08/isco08.zip (retrieved
in March 2017).
7. The unemployment rate was higher in 1992 than 2015 in Germany (6.6% vs.
4.6%) and the United Kingdom (9.7% vs. 5.6%) as well as Sweden in 1997
than 2015 (10.2% vs. 7.4%). However, it was lower in Spain in 1992 than
2015 (18.5% vs. 22.1%; OECD online database).
8. Three sets of information are used to construct the class variable: employ-
ment status (separating employers and the self-employed from employees),
the number of employees (separating large employers with nine and more
employees from small business owners with zero to eight employees), and,
most importantly, detailed occupation (based on ISCO three-digit). For
more detail on the concept and measurement of the class variable, see
Oesch (2006, pp. 270–272). The script used for the construction of this
class schema is available from Daniel Oesch’s website: http://people.unil.
ch/danieloesch/scripts/
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